Racial Discrimination in Major League Baseball: Can It Exist When Performance is Crystal Clear? by Irwin \u2704, Will
The Park Place Economist
Volume 12 | Issue 1 Article 11
2004
Racial Discrimination in Major League Baseball:
Can It Exist When Performance is Crystal Clear?
Will Irwin '04
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Irwin '04, Will (2004) "Racial Discrimination in Major League Baseball: Can It Exist When
Performance is Crystal Clear?," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 12
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol12/iss1/11
Racial Discrimination in Major League Baseball: Can It Exist When
Performance is Crystal Clear?
Abstract
American labor markets have a long history of racial discrimination. Human capital theory demonstrates that,
on average, workers are paid according to their likely productivity, which is estimated by past experiences in
their working lives such as education, previous work experience, and on-the-job training. With MLB,
productivity factors that would be included in a human capital theory based equation might include things
such as home runs, runs batted in, batting average, years of major league experience, and defensive ability.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol12/iss1/11
The Park Place Economist, Volume XII 18
Will  Irwin
Racial Discrimination in Major
League Baseball: Can it Exist When
Performance is Crystal Clear?
I.  INTRODUCTION
Major League Baseball (MLB)Players make millions of dollarsper year to play a game.  The
players come from all over the world to the United
States’ largest cities to perform in front of millions of
fans each year.  From children in the Dominican Re-
public playing on gravel fields with broomsticks for
bats, socks for balls, and milk jugs for gloves to chil-
dren in the wealthy suburbs of southern California,
little boys grow up dreaming
of playing for their favorite
team.  Typically these dreams
revolve around hitting a home
run to win the World Series
or making a diving catch to
save a game and, for ex-
tremely underprivileged chil-
dren, the promise of large
contracts to bring their entire
family out of poverty provide
extra inspiration to make it to
the big leagues.  But are their dreams tainted by the
specter of discrimination?
American labor markets have a long history
of racial discrimination.  Many programs such as af-
firmative action and equal employment opportunity
laws have been instituted to ensure that minority races
are not discriminated against during the hiring pro-
cess, but less has been done to guarantee that once
minority workers have been hired that they receive
equal pay to their white co-workers.  The problem
with most industries is that discriminatory firms can
find reasons to discriminate against minority work-
ers based on productivity factors.  Human capital
theory demonstrates that, on average, workers are
paid according to their likely productivity, which is
estimated by past experiences in their working lives
such as education, previous work experience, and
on-the-job training.  Since oftentimes minorities have
been discriminated against their entire lives in areas
such as these, it becomes very easy for a firm to use
these reasons in order to “legally” discriminate against
them, which is exactly why ra-
cial discrimination is so difficult
to measure in normal indus-
tries.  All of the productivity
variables have an implicit ra-
cial bias built into them, which
blurs the data and makes any
finding on discrimination sus-
pect.
With MLB, productivity fac-
tors that would be included in
a human capital theory based
equation might include things such as home runs, runs
batted in, batting average, years of major league ex-
perience, and defensive ability.  When a white player
hits 50 home runs it should theoretically be treated
the same as when a Latino player hits 50 home runs,
which makes for variables that have no implicit bias.
Another benefit of using MLB players to assess the
state of racial wage discrimination is that many play-
ers, including some of the top players in the league,
come from the poorest areas in Latin America, which
shows that professional baseball is an industry with
“When a white player hits 50
home runs it should theoreti-
cally be treated the same as
when a Latino player hits 50
home runs, which makes for
variables that have no implicit
bias. ”
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little class resistance.  In many industries, where ad-
vanced levels of education are necessary, it is virtu-
ally impossible for a child from a poverty-stricken
country to attain employment in that industry.  Ex-
amples might include doctors, lawyers, accountants,
and business executives.  Since MLB, as an industry,
does not depend on education, but on athletic ability,
a trait that can develop in even the poorest of circum-
stances, it does not fall victim to built in class biases.
By studying racial discrimination in MLB, I
hope to show that it does not
exist.  Since baseball teams that
discriminate would only end up
hurting their own chances of
winning, it seems that there is a
strong incentive to provide fair
wages.  Also, the strong influ-
ence of agents on contract ne-
gotiations should insure that all
contracts are awarded solely on
the basis of performance.  I hy-
pothesize that racial discrimina-
tion does not exist in MLB and that race is not a sig-
nificant predictor of players’ salaries after controlling
for productivity.
The following section, Section II, discusses
some of the past research about discrimination in pro-
fessional sports.  Section III presents my theoretical
model, and Section IV develops my empirical model.
Section V shows my variables and the regression
model.  Section VI describes my data sources and
offers some critique of their usefulness.  Section VII
presents my results from the regression equations, and
Section VIII discusses the conclusions reached from
the results and any possible policy implications that
may be needed.
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW
The study of discrimination in the work force
is rather extensive.  Copious amounts of research exist
in the areas of racial and gender discrimination.  In
these studies, racial discrimination is routinely uncov-
ered and shown to exist (Calaway, 1999).  Some
research even examines MLB.  However, none of
that discrimination research deals with hitters in MLB.
In an article by Bodvarsson and Pettman
(2002) entitled “Racial Wage Discrimination in Ma-
jor League Baseball: Do Free Agency and League
Size Matter,” pitchers are used to determine whether
or not racial wage discrimination exists.  This study
uses a logarithmic regression model with variables
such as race (white or non-white), population of the
player’s metropolitan area, productivity variables,
and racial make-up of the player’s metropolitan area.
Since the study dealt with pitchers, the performance
variables are very different.
Examples include: wins,
losses, saves, strikeouts, and
earned run average.  The
study attempts to determine
whether or not the addition
of more teams to MLB
would eliminate any racial
discrimination that existed.
The theory was that more
teams would increase the
level of competition between
teams for good players, thereby causing teams to
offer fair wages to get the best players.  The results
of this study show that expansion in 1993 did in-
deed eliminate discrimination for pitchers.
In a study titled “Equity and Arbitration in
Major League Baseball,”   Fizel, Krautman, and
Hadley (2002) look at a theory called “Equity
Theory,” which states that workers compare their
efforts to their co-workers that are in comparable
situations and then adjust their behavior based on
that comparison.  They hypothesize that MLB play-
ers look to players of similar abilities to decide how
much they should earn when they file for arbitration
and free agency.  They use both regression and bi-
variate techniques to determine whether or not a
player will decide to file for arbitration.  The results
indicate that players do look at their co-workers
performance and salary when they apply for arbi-
tration.  They do not include a measure of race in
their study.  If they had, perhaps they might have
found whether minority players make different de-
cisions than white players on this topic.
In the context of the current literature, it is
“Since baseball teams that
discriminate would only end
up hurting their own chances
of winning, it seems that there
is a strong incentive to pro-
vide fair wages.”
Will Irwin
The Park Place Economist, Volume XII 20
extremely important to test for the presence of dis-
crimination amongst MLB hitters.  Since no such
research is currently available, it is imperative to
analyze this issue to ensure that minority players are
being treated fairly.
III.  THEORETICAL MODEL
The theoretical basis for this research is hu-
man capital theory.  This theory aims to explain how
productivity factors of a worker’s history influence
how much they are paid in their jobs.  Human capi-
tal is seen as a form of investment.  People can in-
vest in schooling in order to increase their level of
human capital.  Similarly, firms can invest in on-the-
job training for their workers.  Since education in-
creases a worker’s knowledge for skills that can be
applied to a job, theory suggests that this increase in
knowledge will allow the worker to be more pro-
ductive, which will give them the ability to bargain
for higher wages (Rima, 1981).  Firms will pay higher
wages since the marginal productivity of their busi-
ness will be increased with the addition of more hu-
man capital to their workforce.  Also, since invest-
ing in human capital can have costs, such as tuition
for schooling and the opportunity cost of lost wages
during the time period of schooling, employers can
be forced to pay higher wages to people with more
human capital (Mincer, 1958).
In a traditional work setting, the factors that
go into human capital would include educational at-
tainment level, years of work experience, on-the-
job training, and age.  All of these variables, theo-
retically, should give an indication of how produc-
tive a worker will be.  Once an employer knows
how productive the worker will be, he/she can pay
them a wage that is fair for that level of productivity.
For baseball players, the factors that em-
ployers look at to determine salary are very differ-
ent from the traditional job market.  Athletic talent is
the main form of human capital for baseball players.
Since players are simply born with this talent, they
are not rewarded for any investment they make into
their human capital, but rather they are compensated
for their natural ability to produce in an athletic in-
dustry.  However, just as job experience is a form
of human capital for traditional industries, the amount
of time playing high-level professional baseball should
be an important human capital factor for baseball
players.
Therefore, a human capital model for base-
ball will have some different factors, but the factors
in the model will represent productivity in the same
way that education, experience, and training do in a
traditional human capital model.
IV.  EMPIRICAL MODEL
The equation for a traditional human capital
model follows:
Wage = f (education, work experience, on-the-job training, age)
Notice, a factor not included amongst those
variables is race.  When studying race as a determi-
nant of wage compensation, it is important to ac-
count for individual differences in productivity due to
the factors mentioned above in order to determine
whether or not race has an effect.  Since, theoreti-
cally, race alone should not affect a person’s pro-
ductivity, it would be expected that different races
would receive equal pay, ceteris paribus.  Unfortu-
nately, this is not always the case.
In order to determine whether or not MLB
players are receiving fair pay, I include race as one of
the determinant variables.  Other determinant vari-
ables account for traditional productivity factors.
These include measures for offensive and defensive
ability, experience, and reliability of future produc-
tion.
It is important to note that MLB teams are
located in major cities across the country and vary
widely in size from New York City, with a metropoli-
tan area of over 20 million people, to Milwaukee,
with a metropolitan area of just over one million
people (U.S. Census, 2003).  Since teams in smaller
cities would have to pay just as much as teams in
large cities to attract players, some may say that it is
doubtful that a team in a small market can pay a player
equally well as a large market team due to the large
differences in total revenues.  However, for the pur-
pose of this study, it is assumed that a player would
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not accept a lower salary to play in a small market,
and, therefore, that all salary figures are true values
awarded for the level of productivity that is expected
of the player.  Given this assumption, I include no
measure of market size in the model.
Conceptually, a players contract value
could be thought of depending on several catego-
ries of variables:
Contract Value = f (offensive ability, defensive ability,
experience, reliability, race)
From this theoretical equation, I build a
regression equation that I use to test my hypoth-
esis that racial discrimination does not exist in
MLB.
V.  VARIABLES AND REGRESSION
The regression model incorporates the vari-
ables described in the theoretical model and applies
them specifically to the research problem by using
the available data.
The dependent variable is salary.  The data
for this variable consists of a one-year contract value,
the first year of a new contract.  The number of
years of the contract is not included.  This is unfor-
tunate because length of contract could be another
variable in which discrimination could play a role.
However, data for length of contract is not readily
available.
The regression equation attempts to account
for different aspects of a player’s abilities.  For the
purpose of limiting the data and eliminating posi-
tional biases, I use only outfielders in this study.
Typically, scouts and general managers judge play-
ers on the basis of “five tools”: hitting for average,
hitting for power, ability to steal, ability to catch,
and ability to throw.  Table 1 presents the variables.
A.  Offensive Statistics and Variables
Typically, traditional statistics like batting av-
erage, runs batted in, runs scored, home runs, and
steals measure offensive production.  The problem
with using such statistics is that they do not fully cap-
ture the ability of all players to contribute to their
teams.  For example, Player A plays for a team in
which the players in front of him and behind him in
the line-up all hit for high average and power, while
Player B plays for a team in which the players imme-
diately surrounding him in the lineup all hit for poor
average and power.  If Player A and Player B have
exactly the same inherent offensive capability, but are
playing with these different teammates, Player A will
have more runs scored and more runs batted in be-
cause there will be more men on base ahead of him
to drive in and better hitters behind him in order to
drive him in.  Some suggest that this effect will only
bias the runs scored and runs batted in measures of
performance, but it is generally assumed and widely
accepted that home runs and batting average can also
be positively and negatively influenced depending on
the players surrounding a player in the line-up.  In
order to insure that statistical studies of baseball hit-
ters are not flawed due to this “team influence,” a
statistic has been created by baseball scholar Bill
James called “Runs Created” (Dunning, 2003).
The formula for Runs Created has numer-
ous variations.  It has been changed many times by
its creator and also by other researchers that have
used it.  For this study, the most basic formula is
used due to the availability of data (Baseball-
Reference, 2003).
I use the following formula:
Runs Created = (Hits + Walks) * Total Bases / Plate
Appearances
“Total bases” represents the number of bases
reached by a player due to hits.  Thus, for a single,
total bases equals one, for a double, total bases equals
two, for a triple, total bases equals three, and for a
home run, total bases equals four.  “Plate appear-
ances” represents the total number of times a player
comes to the plate.  It differs from “At bats” because
“At bats” subtracts out walks, sacrifices, and hits-
by-pitch.  “At bats” is the statistic used to calculate
batting average (Sports, 2003).
Runs Created attempts to estimate a player’s
total contribution to his team’s total output.  It aims
to eliminate the “double-counting effect” that occurs
when a team scores a run.  To explain, each time a
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run is scored, the player who actually crosses the plate
gets credit for a “run scored”, while the player that
got the hit to drive the other player in gets credit for a
“run batted in.”  Statistically, the run is counted twice.
Therefore, the players on a team that scores 700 runs
in a season might have a sum of 1400 runs scored
and runs batted in (minus special cases where runs
score without a run batted in being awarded).  In or-
der to measure which  players on each team are actu-
ally most responsible for the total offensive output,
the Runs Created variable gives one player more credit
than the other when each run is scored (Dunning,
2003).  The following hypothetical situation further
illustrates this point:
Player A hits a triple to lead off an
inning.  Player B sacrifices Player
A home with a long fly ball to
centerfield.  In this situation, the
statistical breakdown would be:
Player A – 1 hit in 1 at bat for a
1.000% batting average and 1 run
scored, Player B – 0 hits in 0 at
bats for no change to his batting
average and 1 run batted in (sac-
rifice fly outs do not count as an
official at bat).  If these players’
statistics are compared, Player A
would only receive a slight advan-
tage over Player B in the batting
average category.  Their run pro-
duction would be considered equal.
This example of traditional stat-keeping
shows how the player that “did the most” in scoring
the run does not earn the credit that he might techni-
cally deserve.  Runs Created solves this problem by
giving “extra credit.”  Player A would receive three
total bases and Player B would receive zero total
bases.
For regression analysis, Runs Created ap-
pears to be a good alternative to traditional statistics
because it eliminates some of the team bias that is
implicit in the data.  Also, by reducing the number of
independent variables in the regression, using Runs
Created saves valuable degrees of freedom.
In order to further normalize the variable,
each players’ total Runs Created, for the years be-
fore they sign their contract, is divided by the num-
ber of games they have played and then multiplied
by 162 (the number of games in a full season).  This
should show their average ability to produce offen-
sively.
The ability to steal is measured with a stolen
base statistic.  The same procedure used with Runs
Created is also used with steals.  Each player’s steals
value shows the number of steals they have had on
average per season.  On a side note, this statistic
could be extremely interesting due to the fact that
some players’ main purpose for being in a line-up is
to steal bases.  It will be interesting to see if these
stealing specialists are rewarded for their rare tal-
ent.
B.  Defensive Variables
Defensive tools, such as the ability to catch
and to throw, are more difficult to quantify.  For the
ability to catch, the most commonly used statistic is
fielding percentage, but the problem with this statis-
tic is that some slower players do not have the op-
portunity to attempt to make difficult plays and there-
fore end up having higher fielding percentages than
the faster, flashier fielders.  This problem is virtually
unavoidable with the data, so I do not include field-
ing percentage in the regression.
The ability to throw can be easily quantified
with outfield assists.  An assist is awarded to a player
when they throw the ball to another player and this
action results in an out, force or tag.  For outfield-
ers, this statistic is extremely important to their over-
all defensive ability.  For the model, assists are in-
cluded as a 162-game average, calculated in the
same way as the offensive statistics described above.
C.  Experience Variables
In order to account for the traditional hu-
man capital theory variable of experience, I include
the number of games played in MLB.  Since many
players play a few games in a year before playing
their first full year, it would be impossible to include
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a variable such as years of experience.  Number of
games played will clearly differentiate between
young players and veterans, while also allowing all
available statistics prior to contract signing to be used
in calculating potential productivity.
An element of productivity that has nothing
to do with the game of baseball, but will still have an
impact on the human-capital thought processes that
general managers have when deciding how much
money to give to a player is age.  Oftentimes, a team
awards a younger player a large amount of money
over a long period of time, while an older player
may receive a one or two year contract worth an
extremely large amount of money.  Since no research
exists on how age affects salary awards in MLB, it
is uncertain what effect age will have in the regres-
sion equation.  However, in order to receive a more
accurate result from the regression, age must be ac-
counted for with an independent variable.
These variables may give some indication of
reliability, as was discussed before.  One can assume
that an older, more experienced player will have had
a longer period of time to demonstrate exactly how
good of a player they are.  A general manager may
be willing to pay more if they have a deeper, more
concrete understanding of what they are getting for
the money they are paying.  On the other hand, a
young
player could be considered more valuable due to his
youth and potential to develop.  However, it seems
that baseball salaries are awarded more on past per-
formance than on potential future performance, giv-
ing the advantage to the older, more established play-
ers.
D. Racial Variables
I use dummy variables to capture the effect
of race on player salaries.  For both African-Ameri-
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can and Latino players, a one or a zero is used to
designate a player in either of those racial categories.
I capture the effect of being Caucasian using an omit-
ted variable.  Placing players into the aforementioned
categories was accomplished using country of origin
and other factors.
Resulting from the variables in Table 1 will
be a regression equation:
Player Salary = f (RC, ASSIST, STEALS, GP, AGE,
BLACK, LATINO)
VI.  DATA
The wonderful thing about working with MLB
data is that people are fanatical about keeping track
of statistics about every aspect of the game.  From
offensive statistics to defensive statistics, to player
salaries and free agent filings, all of the data found in
this paper is readily accessible on reputable and reli-
able websites.  It is important to note the ease of
Internet research when working with baseball statis-
tics.  Efficiency is drastically increased due to the ex-
treme quickness by which player data can be found
on these websites.  Additionally, definitions of statis-
tics and explanations of how to interpret them are
found easily on the Internet.
The data for offensive and defensive statis-
tics is available from Baseball-Reference.  This
website is basically an encyclopedia of baseball play-
ers and has records of almost every player that has
ever played in the major leagues.
Data for player salaries can be found at a
website run by the chairman of the Business of Base-
ball Committee of the Society for American Baseball
Research. The site is particularly useful in determining
when the players received their salary payments as a
result of a free agent signing because it has a list of all
free agent filings made by players.  Using this list, the
year in which the player entered the free agent mar-
ket can be found and their performance data from the
previous years can be used to determine on what basis
their new contract was awarded.
The data for the race variable is less con-
crete.  In many cases the player’s country of origin
indicates which category they should be placed in
(Baseball-Reference, 2003).  For example, all play-
ers from the Dominican Republic are considered to
be Latino. The same can be said for players from
any other country in Central and South America.
For minority players born in the United States, the
distinction is more difficult to make.  Typically, a
determination can be made based on the origin of
the player’s last name.  A name of Hispanic origin
would tend to indicate that the player is Latino.
Conversely, a recognizable “American name” would
categorize the player as black.  Any cases where no
determination could be made with some certainty
are excluded.
VII.  RESULTS
The results from the regression are quite
good.  The model has an Adjusted R-square value
of .545, showing a fairly high goodness of fit.
As for independent variables, the
unstandardized coefficients, t-statistics, and signifi-
cance values are presented in Table 2.
The two significant variables are Runs Cre-
ated and Games Played.  The rest are not significant
with extremely low significance values.
Runs Created has a significance value of
.003 and, as expected, a positive coefficient of
43,128, indicating that an additional run created re-
sults in 43,128 more dollars in the value of a player’s
contract.  To put this in perspective, adding a Runs
Created value of 10 for a season would add
$430,127 to a player’s salary.  The average Runs
Created value for the sample is 78.2.  Traditionally,
a season of 100 runs created is considered a very
good season.
The other significant variable, Games
Played, has a positive coefficient of 5,448 and a
significance value of .000.  This variable indicates
that an additional year of experience (162 more
games played) should translate, on average, into
882,511 more dollars.  Obviously, an upper limit to
this variable must exist or the oldest players in the
league would all be the highest paid, but for this study,
the positive value of the coefficient was expected.
Since the group of players used in this group is rela-
tively young, their games played numbers are also
relatively low, so it is to be expected that more ex-
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perience will benefit these younger workers.  The
highest number of games played in this study is 982,
so these results can only indicate a rate of return on
games played up to that point.  After that, or possi-
bly before, the return to games played may become
negative, reflecting the older age of the player, which
may make a player less desirable.
Steals, Assists, and Age are all non-signifi-
cant variables in this regression with significance val-
ues of .977, .753, and .411, respectively.  All of
these variables were expected to have positive co-
efficients, but their low significance values suggest
that the signs on the coefficients are relatively mean-
ingless.  According to these results, steals, defense,
and age are not important determinants of baseball
players’ salaries.
Most important for the purpose of this study
are the race dummy variables, both of which are not
significant.  The dummy variable for blacks carries a
positive coefficient of 555,729.0 with a significance
value of .296, while the dummy variable for Latinos
carries a positive coefficient of 202,386.1 and a sig-
nificance value of .691.  Since the variables are not
significant, the signs and magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients are not important.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to determine
whether or not racial discrimination exists in MLB.
After running the regression equation and finding race
variables that were not significant, it can be concluded
that under this set of circumstances, racial discrimi-
nation does not exist for outfielders in MLB.  The
positive implications of this are obvious.  It is an indi-
cation that if productivity is clear and unbiased in na-
ture, employers will provide fair wages to all em-
ployees.  Obviously, very few industries exist with
such clear cut and easily measured productivity, but
just the fact that minority workers are paid fairly when
productivity is clear is a positive sign for the state of
the American social consciousness.
Future research could examine total contract
value, which would capture the length of contracts to
see if baseball owners prefer one race to another for
long term contracts.  Additionally, researchers could
expand the regression to include all positional play-
ers, to try to get a better representation of the entire
league’s salary structure.
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